By Marcus Kolga, April 3, 2025
Russia’s disinformation tactics pose a direct threat to democracies worldwide. Like Canada, Japan has become a key Kremlin target because of its G7 membership, alliance with the U.S., and strong democratic institutions.. In response, Moscow has expanded its influence operations, launching a dedicated Japanese-language version of Sputnik News and orchestrating the well-documented Pravda News campaign to push Kremlin narratives into Japanese discourse.
Russia’s global information warfare against the alliance of democratic nations spans a broad range of tactics. This includes using state-owned outlets, proxy channels, and international networks of influencers who amplify and legitimize Kremlin aligned narratives. While our attention often focuses on the Kremlin’s influence campaigns in Europe and North America, we must not overlook Russia’s concurrent efforts in East Asia—where Russian narratives are echoed by Chinese state media—and target our allies, including Japan.
Russia’s long history of information warfare against Japan dates back nearly a century, to the 1930s, when NKVD operatives are believed to have fabricated the Tanaka Memorial—a forged document designed to portray Japan as an expansionist aggressor. Historians and intelligence experts widely speculate that the Soviet objective was to stoke tensions and provoke conflict between Japan and China, a strategy that closely mirrors Russia’s modern-day influence operations. As outlined in a September 2024 FBI affidavit, Moscow’s disinformation playbook remains unchanged: exploit historical grievances, inflame regional conflicts, and sow division within Western societies to advance the Kremlin’s strategic interests.
Japan’s strategic importance, in a region increasingly shaped by Sino-Russian alignment, makes it a prime target of Russian information and influence operations today.
The Kuril Islands, a focal point of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions, have increasingly become a target of Moscow’s information warfare, as have Japan’s G7 aligned sanctions against Russia. Just as it has done in its information warfare against Ukraine, the Kremlin weaponizes historical disputes and territorial claims to fuel distrust, manipulate public opinion, and justify its revisionist agenda.
Canada, as a G7 partner and democracy, is well-positioned to work alongside Japan in countering foreign disinformation. Both nations face parallel threats from authoritarian regimes that seek to undermine democratic institutions and manipulate public discourse. A coordinated approach strengthens resilience on both sides of the Pacific, making it harder for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities.
This report underscores the urgent need for deeper strategic cooperation, mutual support, and robust civil society partnerships—particularly between Canada and Japan. Defending our democracies against authoritarian disinformation requires a united front, and the time to act is now.
Russia’s strategic interests
Information and influence operations (FIMI) are a key element of the Kremlin’s intelligence operations toolbox and foreign policy, leveraging them to create environments conducive to Kremlin objectives.
The primary objectives of Russia’s global information warfare are to:
- Erode western support for Ukraine, and terminate the flow of western aid to Ukraine;
- Undermine unity within western alliances, including the EU, NATO, and G7;
- Break down trust in Western democratic institutions, delegitimize independent media, and fracture social cohesion within democratic societies.
Japan—as a G7 economic power, a reliable ally of western liberal democratic nations, and a neighbour to Russia—is a target of Kremlin FIMI. Moscow benefits from weakening Japan’s credibility on the global stage and driving wedges between Tokyo and its democratic partners. A key focus of this effort is the Kremlin’s claim over the Kuril Islands, where Russia relentlessly insists that Japan’s territorial claim is illegitimate. By distorting historical and legal facts, the Kremlin muddles the issue and confuses international audiences in efforts to erode global support for Japan’s position.
With their shared experiences, Canada has every reason to work closely with Japan to counter these threats. Both nations have imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its criminal invasion of Ukraine, and both face Russian disinformation campaigns that threaten their national interests.
Disinformation techniques
Russia merges classic propaganda with modern digital manipulation to shape opinions:
- State-controlled media: RT, Sputnik (including its Japanese-language platform), TASS, and others synchronize stories that echo official Kremlin positions and publish disinformation to undermine targets.
- Inauthentic amplification: Organized bot networks create an illusion of grassroots outrage or consensus on platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Japanese-language social sites. These tactics polarize debates, turning complex issues into heated standoffs.
- Selective history: The Kremlin repeatedly cites World War II outcomes to legitimize its hold on the islands, bypassing any references to subsequent treaties or other complicating details.
- Geopolitical spin: By highlighting Japan’s alliance with the United States, Russia frames Tokyo as a Western pawn. This feeds nationalist currents in Japan, and paints the dispute as part of a larger East vs. West narrative.
Canada has seen similar strategies deployed in attempts to sway public opinion on matters such as national elections and energy policy. A joint Canada-Japan strategy to monitor, track, and expose these methods would deny the Kremlin its preferred element of surprise.
Disinformation narrative: the Kuril Islands dispute
The Kuril Islands—or Northern Territories—anchor Moscow’s anti-Japan messaging. The islands were unilaterally annexed by Moscow in 1945. Kremlin-backed outlets like RT and Sputnik routinely present Russia’s control as a settled fact, depicting Japan’s stance as extreme or revisionist. However, Japan’s democratic allies, such as the European Union, have called for the return of the islands to Japan.
Just as the Kremlin has recently accused Canada of militarizing the Arctic and seeking conflict, it has similarly portrayed Japan as a hostile actor over the Kuril Islands. In a familiar disinformation tactic, the Kremlin frames defensive postures as aggression to justify its own actions. A 2012 RT article, for example, distorted comments from a former Japanese diplomat to falsely suggest that Japan was preparing a naval blockade of the islands—a gross exaggeration designed to stoke tensions and manipulate public perception.
By advancing narratives that cast Tokyo’s claims as illegitimate, these outlets also seek to inflame patriotism within Russia while sowing confusion in Japan. Internationally, the portrayal of an intransigent Tokyo undermines Japan’s efforts to rally broader support for a negotiated solution. Japanese lawmakers then face competing internal pressures—some calling for a tough line on Russia, others pushing for diplomacy—which dilutes Tokyo’s overall policy coherence.
Moreover, Canada can learn from how these narratives distort territorial disputes, since Russia has employed similar disinformation techniques elsewhere. In turn, Canadian experiences in identifying and debunking Russian propaganda targeting Canada’s Arctic can help Japan neutralize misleading or inflammatory content—particularly online.
Russia’s “Pravda” network targeting Japan
In early 2024, France’s VIGINUM published a report about a large-scale pro-Russian “Pravda” disinformation network comprising at least 193 sites centered on ones belonging to Pravda-News (not the Soviet era newspaper). These sites aggregate news from others and focus on the re-amplification and laundering of Russian propaganda from social media, state news agencies, and official sources.
Recent investigations by EDMO, DFRLab, and NewsGuard confirm that this network has significantly expanded its activities. The network uses localized domains, sensational headlines, and carefully chosen “experts” to shape opinions in target countries. Now, Japan faces growing pressure from these tactics.
NewsGuard reports that Russian operators have embedded links from the “Pravda” network into Wikipedia articles on Ukraine and other Russia-related topics in a deliberate effort to manipulate large AI models. By poisoning these sources with Kremlin-aligned disinformation, they aim to influence AI-generated responses and distort public understanding of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
In Japan, this manifests through localized websites and articles designed to appear legitimate and homegrown. They frequently promote Kremlin aligned conspiratorial themes, challenge Tokyo’s alliance with Washington, and exploit contentious issues like the disputed Northern Territories. Pravda’s Japanese language site seeks to blur the line between credible information and propaganda. According to the American Sunlight Project, “sites belonging to the network posted as many as 650 articles per hour.”
The pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-controlled content published to this network has been amplified on social media over the past number of years. The fact that a Japanese language version has been created underscores the significance of Japan as a target. The impact of this network on the Japanese social media and information environment demands further investigation.
Impact on public opinion and policy
The ultimate goal of Russian FIMI is to impact western political decision making. In early 2025, the impact of Russian information operations on the U.S. presidential administration has become evident, with United States President Donald Trump echoing Kremlin propaganda and disinformation about Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump’s statements align with well-established Russian narratives aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and legitimizing Moscow’s aggression.
While it remains unclear how Trump was exposed to these narratives or what motivated him to repeat them, his amplification of Kremlin talking points marks a significant and historic victory for Russia’s FIMI operations.
Trump has adopted Russia’s FIMI tactics to justify its full-scale invasion of Ukraine—denying borders and Ukraine’s very existence as a nation—by applying the same logic to the U.S.-Canada border and questioning Canada’s status as an independent nation. This rhetoric mirrors Kremlin narratives and further destabilizes Western alliances.
In the Japanese context, it is not inconceivable that Trump could align with the Kremlin on the issue of the Kuril Islands, potentially undermining Japan’s position.
Canada’s experience underscores the need for swift reaction and consistent public education. By applying those lessons in a collaborative framework, Canada can help Japan build strategies that ensure fact-based debate prevails over fabricated narratives.
Canada-Japan collaboration
Canada and Japan can strengthen their co-operation to counter Russian information and influence operations (IIOs) by coordinating efforts between their respective ministries of foreign affairs, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), civil society practitioners, media organizations, and activists. This collaboration should focus on intelligence-sharing, joint response mechanisms, and deterrence strategies.
Sharing of threat intelligence
Objective: Enhance situational awareness and ensure real-time information exchange on Russian IIO tactics, narratives, and operational trends.
- Bilateral and multilateral intelligence-sharing between Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in coordination with intelligence agencies such as Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA).
- Integration with the G7 RRM to facilitate cross-allied monitoring and identification of Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Japan and Canada.
- Regular briefings and classified reports shared with trusted civil society groups, independent journalists, and fact-checkers to enhance public resilience.
Sharing forecasting intelligence
Objective: Predict emerging Russian disinformation campaigns and pre-empt their impact on public discourse and national security.
- Joint research initiatives between Canadian and Japanese cybersecurity and disinformation researchers and practitioners to analyze trends in Russian influence operations.
- Early-warning mechanisms developed through AI-driven detection tools and media monitoring platforms to anticipate information warfare tactics before they gain traction.
- Collaboration with academic institutions and think tanks in both countries to produce risk assessments and scenario planning exercises.
Coordination of response and disruption
Objective: Synchronize strategies to counter and neutralize Russian disinformation narratives in real time.
- Coordinated media responses from Canada and Japan to debunk and challenge Russian falsehoods through fact-based counter messaging.
- Government-backed support for independent media and investigative journalists in exposing Russia’s tactics, particularly in Asia-Pacific and North America.
- Disruption of Russian-affiliated networks, including removal of disinformation websites and social media operations through partnerships with tech companies.
- Rapid information-sharing between national cybersecurity agencies to track and disable bot networks, fake news outlets, and troll farms amplifying Russian narratives.
Coordination of deterrence mechanisms
Objective: Increase the costs of Russian influence operations through diplomatic, economic, and strategic countermeasures.
- Sanctions coordination between Canada and Japan, targeting individuals and entities linked to Russian disinformation operations (including state media like RT, Sputnik, and proxy networks).
- Joint diplomatic responses, including summoning Russian ambassadors and issuing formal condemnations when Russian information warfare campaigns target either country.
- Coordinated engagement with international allies (G7, Five Eyes, QUAD) to enforce a unified approach to countering Russian information warfare in North America and the Indo-Pacific.
Russia’s targeting of Canada, Japan and their allies is intensifying and growing, as former allies fall prey to these operations and become willing or unwitting accomplices of them. This represents an indisputable threat to Japan’s and Canada’s interests, democracies, and societies..
By leveraging shared intelligence, forecasting capabilities, response mechanisms, and coordinated deterrence measures, Canada and Japan can strengthen their resilience against Russian information and influence operations.
Ultimately, defending democratic societies from foreign influence is a collective endeavor—one that cannot succeed if nations act alone. By merging Canada’s expertise on Russian interference with Japan’s regional knowledge and vigilance, both countries can effectively push back against Moscow’s disinformation playbook. This collaborative effort not only protects the integrity of Japanese and Canadian democracy but also signals to the world that principles of truth and transparency, and our shared democratic values will triumph over the cynicism of authoritarian propaganda.
Marcus Kolga is the director of DisinfoWatch and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
